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Abstract 
In the present research, we tested the hypotheses that (1) adults are intuitive mind-body 
dualists, (2) that this belief can be considered a default, and (3) that it is partially explained by 
essentialistic reasoning about the nature of the mind. Over eight studies, employing various 
thought experiment paradigms, participants reliably ascribed to a physically duplicated being 
a greater retention of physical than of mental properties. This difference was unrelated to 
whether or not this being was given a proper name (Study 1b) and was only found for entities 
that were considered to actually possess a mind (Study 1c). Further, we found that an intuitive 
belief in mind-body dualism may in fact be considered a default: Taxing participantsÕ 
cognitive resources (Study 2) or priming them with an intuitive (vs. analytical) thinking style 
(Studies 3a & 3b) both increased dualistic beliefs. In a last set of studies, we found that beliefs 
in mind-body dualism are indeed related to essentialistic reasoning about the mind. When a 
living being was reassembled from its original molecules rather than recreated from new 
molecules, dualistic beliefs were significantly reduced (Studies 4a & 4b).  
Thus, results of the present research indicate that, despite any acquired scientific knowledge 
about the neurological origins of mental life, most adults remain Òessentialistic mind-body 
dualistsÓ at heart. 
 
 Keywords: common-sense beliefs; nave theories; mind-body dualism; thought experiments; 
essentialism 
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Introduction 
In the 2006 Hollywood movie The Prestige (Nolan, 2006), the protagonistÑa 
struggling magician in the 1920sÑdevised the ultimate illusion: The transported man! On 
stage, the magician is strapped to a futuristic-looking device, and upon the pull of a lever is 
shrouded by fog and lightning. In the blink of an eye he disappears, only to reveal himself on 
a balcony opposite of the stage. He seems to have been magically transported. Yet, 
unbeknownst to the astounded audience, something entirely different took place. Instead of 
carrying out an instant transportation, the device created a 100% perfect duplicate of the 
magician in an elsewhere located second unit, while the ÒoriginalÓ magician fell through a 
trapdoor and drowned in a water tank below the stage. The duplicate then proceeds to reap the 
rewards of his feat. Thus, the magician willingly dies every night so that his doppelgnger (or 
himself) can continue with the show, without ever having any recollection of dying. The 
viewer is now left with an interesting variation of Derek ParfitÕs (1984) famous 
ÒteleportationÓ thought experiment and the question: Is the duplicate person still the same 
person as the original? What if the original magician somehow survived, which of the two 
would then be him? 
Most of us intuitively find these questions difficult to answer. People have the natural 
tendency to perceive themselves, others, and even non-living entities to possess certain 
immeasurable qualities, or essences, that are not described by physical properties and that 
ultimately define who or what they are (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Newman 
& Keil, 2008; Gottfried, Gelman, & Shultz, 1999). This belief, referred to as essentialism, 
helps to explain why, for example, the intention of a creator plays an important role for us in 
the assessment of his or her creation (Newman & Bloom, 2012), or why we believe that even 
mundane objects can ÒtransmitÓ negative personality traits (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000). When 
it comes to human beings, thinking in terms of essences can have even more striking effects, 
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which may be the reason for why we are unsure about whether the duplicate magician remains 
the same magician. We are inclined to believe that humans possess one unique immeasurable 
quality, sometimes labeled a soul, a mind, or a spirit, that cannot be copied by a machine or 
simulated by a computer. In our intuition, this essence is the home of our thoughts, emotions 
and personal identity, and effectively makes us what we are. Based on our phenomenological 
experience, we perceive our bodies and this essence to be two separable, yet somehow 
interacting, entitiesÑa notion referred to as Cartesian mind-body dualism (Descartes, 
1641/1984). In other words, we do not perceive ourselves to be a bundle of firing neurons, but 
rather, as if we occupy our physical body, using it to navigate the material world (Bloom, 
2004; Boyer, 2001; Forstmann, Burgmer, & Mussweiler, 2012; cf., the Cartesian theater, 
Dennet, 1991).  
Such lay beliefs in mind-body dualism can be found in virtually all human cultures 
(Chudek, McNamara, Birch, Bloom, & Heinrich, 2013; Roazzi, Nyhof, & Johnson, 2013; 
Cohen, 2007) and seem to be one of the prerequisites for the development of more elaborate 
supernatural beliefs, such as in a life after death, in reincarnation, or ghosts (e.g., Bering, 
2006; Bloom, 2007). All these beliefs require an individual to entertain the notion that mental 
states can somehow survive the death of a physical body and therefore rely on endorsing the 
view that mental life is not fully explained by physical processes.  
But one does not need to resort to religious scripture or philosophical teachings to find 
examples of mind-body dualism. Pop culture is riddled with tales of juveniles waking up in 
bodies of adults, adults waking up in the bodies of giant beetles, or minds of serial-killers 
being trapped in childrenÕs toys. All these scenarios share a dualistic view of minds and 
bodies, as a physical transformation occurs without a logically required change of mental 
states. But even in the absence of actual human beings does a belief in the independent nature 
of mind and body affect our understanding of the social world. For example, it may allow us 
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to ascribe mental processesÑsuch as rational thought or intentionalityÑto factually non-
living entities, and thus perceive minds where there logically should not be any (cf. Gray, 
Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). Although we know that, for 
example, shoes usually do not possess a central nervous system, a TV commercial involving a 
thinking and talking shoe would not strike us as mind-bending or utterly confusing. We all 
readily comprehend the concept of a mind that is independent from a physical body and that 
exists in the absence of a brain. But why is this the case, and why is this phenomenon so 
culturally ubiquitous? 
 As some researchers argue, the perceived separation of mind and body that defines 
mind-body dualism is rooted in our most fundamental cognitive architecture (Bloom, 2004; 
Bering, 2006), which seems to be predisposed to differentially process social and non-social 
stimuli (Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & Wynn, 2004; Legerstee, 1992). We have the natural tendency 
to attribute goals to agents, interpret their behaviors as means to reach these goals, and 
thereby make inferences about mental processes that we cannot directly perceive with any of 
our senses (Gergely, Ndasdy, Csibra, & Br, 1995). This often-called Òtheory of mindÓ 
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001)Ñour ability to take othersÕ perspectives and infer their 
mental statesÑis believed to constitute an evolutionary-acquired skill, necessary to accurately 
predict the behavior of others, that ultimately enables the formation of dualistic beliefs 
(Povinelli & Bering, 2002). That is, it fosters the development of two different modes of 
construal, one dealing with the physical, the other with the social world. Following this logic, 
beliefs in mind-body dualism can be considered a Òby-productÓ of our cognitive architecture, 
which is tuned to distinguish between observable bodies and unobservable mental processes 
(Bloom, 2004; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). In line with this reasoning, recent findings suggest 
a close interlink between explicit beliefs in mind-body dualism and cognitive processes that 
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emerge from our ability to acknowledge other peopleÕs mental statesÑin particular 
conceptual and spatial perspective-taking (Burgmer, Forstmann, Todd, & Mussweiler, 2014). 
Given this basic-cognitive nature of dualistic beliefs, it is reasonable to assume that 
they can be considered a Òdefault beliefÓ that all humans rudimentary share from early on in 
their lives. In fact, past research in developmental psychology strongly hints at this notion 
(e.g., Johnson & Wellman, 1982). For example, children who were told a story about an 
anthropomorphized mouse that was eaten by an alligator subsequently ascribed more 
continuing emotional (e.g., fear) than physical states (e.g., hunger) to the dead mouse that 
lingers in the afterlife (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; but see also Astuti & Harris, 2008). Even 
more recently, Hood and colleagues (2012) found further evidence for mind-body dualism in 
pre-school children. Children of that certain age believed that ÒmagicallyÓ duplicating a 
physical entityÑin this case a live hamsterÑdoes not duplicate mental states associated with 
the original to the same extent as physical states. At this developmental stage, children seem 
to understand that people need a brain for remembering facts or doing calculus, but they 
regard it as a tool that they themselves use to execute these operations. In their perception, 
their brain is not responsible for their identity or for phenomenological experiences such as 
pretending to be a kangaroo or loving oneÕs siblings (Bloom, 2004; Lillard, 1996). The 
knowledge that everything humans experience can be entirely understood as a function of 
brain activity, corresponding to the philosophical position referred to as physicalism, seems to 
be acquired in later developmental stages through education and enculturation (Choe, Keil, & 
Bloom, 2012; Johnson, 1990).  
As a result, when explicitly asked about their conceptions about the relation of minds 
and bodies, most adults in Western societies deny that both are entirely independent entities 
(Procter, 2008) and have a slight tendency to agree with strictly physicalistic rather than 
dualistic statements (Hook & Farah, 2013). However, as research has shown that nave 
        Intuitive Mind-Body Dualism 7 
 
theories can easily co-exist with acquired scientific knowledge (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012), 
an explicit endorsement of physicalistic beliefs cannot rule out that people remain intuitive 
mind-body dualists at heart.  
  
The Present Research 
The present research aimed at providing initial evidence for this proposition. Thereby, 
our goal was to further the understanding of the nature of dualistic beliefs as well as their 
underlying processes. More precisely, the goals of the present research were threefold: First, 
adapting a paradigm designed by Hood and colleagues (2012), we set out to develop a reliable 
measure for intuitive mind-body dualism in adults, consequently showing that such beliefs are 
still prevalent in developmental stages that extend beyond early childhood (Studies 1aÑ1c). 
Second, we tested the hypothesis that beliefs in mind-body dualism can in fact be considered 
a default that most people intuitively share. If that was the case, taking up a physicalistic (i.e., 
non-dualistic) stance would require the use of cognitive resources to correct for our initial 
(dualistic) intuition. Therefore, we tested whether taxing participants cognitive resources 
(Study 2) or priming them with an intuitive (vs. deliberative) thinking-style (Studies 3a & 3b) 
would increase intuitive mind-body dualism. Third, in line with the previously discussed 
reasoning, we sought to find initial support for the proposition that dualistic beliefs are 
grounded in essentialistic beliefs about the nature of the mind. To that end, we tested, whether 
dualistic beliefs are intimately linked to a belief in invisible and undetectable properties of 
matter that turn any entity into something that supersedes the sum of its parts (Studies 4a & 
4b). 
 
Study 1a 
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In the first study, our goal was to develop a new measure for intuitive mind-body 
dualism in adults, based on an experimental paradigm previously employed by Hood and 
colleagues (2012), and to show that intuitive dualistic beliefs are still prevalent among adults. 
In the original study, 5-6 year-old children were introduced to a scientific looking machine 
(cf., Hood & Bloom, 2008)Ñcomplete with flashing lights and buzzersÑand were told that 
this machine was able to duplicate any object placed inside one of its adjacent boxes. 
Subsequently, children were introduced to a live hamster, and were told about some of the 
hamsterÕs unique physical attributes, namely a blue heart, a broken tooth, and a marble in his 
stomach. They were further asked to show the hamster a picture, whisper their names into his 
ear, and tickle him in the back, thereby creating novel mental states in the hamster in form of 
episodic memory. After successfully ÒduplicatingÓ the hamster (with the help of a hidden 
experimenter, an identical looking second hamster, and some sleight of hand), the children 
were asked about physical and mental attributes of both the original and the duplicate. Ruling 
out several alternative explanations, the authors were able to demonstrate that children 
reliably attributed to a duplicate hamster the originalÕs physical properties to a greater extent 
than the originalÕs mental states. In line with previous findings in developmental psychology 
(e.g., Bering & Bjorklund, 2004), this divergence can be considered an early manifestation of 
an intuitive belief in mind-body dualism.  
In adapting this paradigm for adults, we modified it on a few critical dimensions. 
Instead of involving a live demonstration, the measure was constructed as a text-based 
thought experiment with a more scientific framing than the original paradigm. We 
hypothesized thatÑregardless of any explicit religious belief or knowledge about the physical 
origins of the mindÑadults would intuitively dissociate minds and bodies the same way 
children did in the original study. 
Method 
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Participants and design.  Ninety-eight participants
1
 recruited from AmazonÕs 
Mechanical Turk website (62 females, MAge = 37.50, SD = 13.09) participated in exchange for 
monetary compensation. Each participant worked on the thought experiment task described 
below. 
Materials and procedure. In this thought experiment, participants were asked to 
imagine a future in which scientists developed a device, which allows them to Òduplicate any 
kind of object in a matter of seconds using highly-advanced technology. After placing an 
object into a small chamber, a computer scans the entire object (i.e., the entire content of the 
chamber), every molecule and every single atom, and stores the information digitally. The 
information is then used to recreate the scanned object in a second chamber from basic 
chemical elements, molecule for molecule, resulting in a 100% identical copy of the scanned 
object, with a 100% success rateÓ (see Supplementary Materials). Emphasis was put on the 
fact that the duplicate was 100% identical to the original, as well as to the 100% success rate 
of the procedure, in order to prevent participants from questioning the accuracy or reliability 
of the device. The whole procedure was further explained by a picture, detailing the 
functionality of the device. Participants were subsequently told that ÒÑ after some successful 
trials with solid objectsÑthe scientists place the lab hamster Jimmy into the first chamber and 
duplicate it.Ó   
                                                
1
 Sample-sizes for Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, 4a, and 4b are based on broad a-priori estimates of effect sizes. Sample size 
for Study 3a was determined by responses to an open call for participation posted to a mailing list. For Study 3b 
the goal was to collect as many participants as possible in the time in which lab space was available. Sample size 
for Study 2 was based on the original study by Conway and Gawronski (2012). Odd numbers in sample sizes for 
online studies were caused by random assignment of participants to different experiments. All exclusions of 
participants are mentioned in-text. 
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Next, participants learned about 12 properties of Jimmy, 6 of which were physical and 
6 of which were mental in nature, presented in a fixed random order (see Table 1). For 
example, they learned that Jimmy has a limp (physical) and is afraid of the cruel lab intern 
(mental). The different physical and mental attributes were carefully designed to capture 
different aspects of each dimension. Physical attributes contained states that were innate 
(Jimmy has a dark spot in his fur), acquired and stable (Jimmy has a scar on his back), or 
acquired and temporary (Jimmy currently has the flu). Two items were designed to be more 
ÒcomplexÓ in nature, and included one item that directly pertains to the brainÑthe actual 
source of mental statesÑand one item that pertains to the eye, one of the more complex 
organs in human and non-human animals and furthermore the place where a considerable 
number of people locate the ÒselfÓ of a being (Starmans & Bloom, 2012). 
Mental attributes were designed to represent affective (Jimmy feels at home in the 
lab), basic-cognitive (Jimmy reacts to his name being called), and memory-related (Jimmy 
vividly remembers his sister) states.  
Participants then learned that Ò[o]nly one second later, the process is completed and a 
100% perfect duplicate of JimmyÑfor reference named ÒBertÓÑemerges in the second 
chamber.Ó They were subsequently asked to indicate on 7-point Likert-type scales ranging 
from definitely no over undecided to definitely yes, how each physical and mental attribute 
(still) applies to each hamster. Asking not only about the duplicate but also about the original 
hamster allows to control for the fact that participants may have thought the duplication 
procedure somehow altered physical or mental attributes of the original, thereby making it 
impossible to correctly interpret the results obtained for the duplicate (cf. Hood et al., 2012).  
For each hamster, scores for the six physical properties (original: α = .83, duplicate: α 
= .79), as well as scores for the six mental attributes (original: α = .80, duplicate: α = .95) 
were combined to form indices representing ascribed retention of physical and mental 
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attributes. If people do intuitively separate minds from bodies, differences in ascribed mental 
properties between original and duplicate should be greater than differences in ascribed 
physical properties.  
 
{TABLE 1} 
 
Results and Discussion 
 No participants were excluded from data analysis. 
Factor Analysis. We conducted a principle axis factor analysis with oblim rotation on 
the 12 items pertaining to the duplicate hamster
2
. Two factors emerged with eigenvalues 
greater than 1 (5.70 and 2.28, respectively), collectively accounting for 67% of the variance in 
responses. As hypothesized, all six items intended to describe mental attributes loaded 
stronger on factor 1 than on factor 2, and were overall the items with the strongest loading on 
factor 1. Conversely, the remaining six items intended to describe physical attributes loaded 
stronger on factor 2 than on factor 1, and were also overall the items with the strongest 
loading on this factor. The two isolated factors (extracted by regression) were significantly 
positively correlated with one another (r = .40, p < .001), suggesting that both factors are 
tapping related (i.e., general accuracy of the device), yet distinct (i.e., mental vs. physical 
properties) constructs.  
 Main Analysis. For the main analysis, we expected to observe a greater difference in 
ascriptions of mental properties to both hamsters than in ascriptions of physical properties. A 
two-way repeated measures ANOVA over all four indices revealed the proposed hamster 
(original vs. duplicate) × dimension (physical vs. mental) interaction, F(1, 97) = 107.7, p < 
                                                
2
 Responses pertaining to the original hamster did not vary sufficiently enough to allow conducting a meaningful 
factor analysis. 
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.001, ηp² = .56. More precisely, a paired-samples t-test revealed that differences in the 
ascription of mental properties between original and duplicate (M = 2.85, SD = 1.96) were 
indeed greater than differences in the ascription of physical properties (M = 0.93, SD = 1.39), 
t(97) = 10.39, p < .001, d = 1.08
3
. Analyzing responses to the individual hamsters, we found 
no difference in the ascription of retained physical versus mental properties for the original 
hamster (p > .25), whereas participants ascribed to the duplicate hamster a greater retention of 
physical properties (M = 5.77, SD = 1.30) than of mental properties (M = 3.91, SD = 1.88), 
t(97) = 10.31, p < .001, d = 1.09; see Figure 1. 
In line with the previously discussed findings by Hood and colleagues (2012), this 
dissociation seems to indicate that people intuitively do perceive mental states to be partly 
independent from physical properties and thus assume a physical copy of a living being has 
mental states that differ from the original. They therefore seem to be intuitive mind-body 
dualists. 
 
{FIGURE 1} 
 
 However, similarly in line with Hood and colleagues (2012), participants ascribed to 
the duplicate hamster a significantly lesser degree of retained physical properties as compared 
to the original, although instructions clearly stated that the device created a Ò100% identical 
copy of the original with a 100% success rate". One reason for this effect could be that 
participants questioned the accuracy of the duplication device described. As a result, one 
could argue that participants believed small inaccuracies in the physical duplication procedure 
to have more striking effects on mental than on physical properties of the duplicate. We 
                                                
3
All within-subject CohenÕs d effect sizes were corrected for dependence between means using Morris and 
DeShon's (2002) equation 8. 
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therefore independently analyzed the data of only those participants who ascribed the exact 
same level of physical attributes to both the original and the duplicate (~ 30% of the sample). 
As this isÑdespite the obvious reduction of statistical powerÑthe most conservative way to 
analyze the present data, any deviation in ascriptions of retained mental properties could be 
attributed to an intuitive mind-body dualism.  
In line with the results presented above, differences in the ascription of mental 
properties between original and duplicate (M = 1.15, SD = 1.78) were significantly greater 
than the (per definition) non-existent differences in the ascription of physical properties; t(28) 
= 3.47, p = .002, d = 0.65. Similarly, the hamster (original vs. duplicate) × dimension 
(physical vs. mental) interaction remained significant, F(1, 28) = 12.01, p = .002; ηp² = .30.
 4
, 
see Figure 2. This demonstrates that participantsÕ intuitive mind-body dualism cannot solely 
be attributed to differences in ascriptions of retained physical properties to the duplicate, but 
rather to a true belief in the independent nature of mental phenomena and physical matter. 
5
 
However, a second explanation for the attenuated ascription of physical properties to 
the duplicate could be that participants perceived the items we intended to be entirely physical 
in nature to be (partly) attributable to mental states. For example, although we found the 12 
items we designed to load on two factors corresponding to our mental/physical distinction, 
some participants may have assumed that a limp can be partly explained by psychological 
                                                
4
 The same results can be observed when only taking those participants into the analysis that ascribe maximum 
retention values (i.e., a mean of 7) to physical properties of original and duplicate, F(1, 24) = 11.43, p = .003; ηp² 
= .33 (~24% of participants). 
5
 For all of our studies we added additional analyses to the Supplementary Materials, showing that the attenuated 
ascription of physical properties to the duplicates does not fully explain the attenuated ascription of mental states 
to the duplicates. Specifically, statistically controlling for differences in ascriptions of physical attributes to 
original and duplicate does not affect the diverging ascriptions of mental states or effects of our primings on this 
divergence. 
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factors, or that a flu is somehow less physical than a scar. Therefore, the observed decrease in 
ascriptions of physical properties to the duplicate may in fact have been caused by the same 
processes responsible for the attenuation of ascribed mental properties, without necessarily 
indicating a disbelief in the accuracy of the duplication device. 
 
 
{FIGURE 2} 
 
In sum, the present results show that adults seem to intuitively dissociate minds from 
bodies in a duplication thought experiment. The following two studies were designed to both 
confirm these results and rule out potential confounds of this measure. 
 
Study 1b 
Study 1a revealed that people seem to perceive mental states of a hamster to be partly 
independent of its physical body. However, giving both hamsters proper names (for 
identification purposes) may have artificially highlighted the notion that both have a unique 
identity, commonly understood as having distinct mental states (cf., Gelman & Taylor, 1984; 
Gutheil et al., 2008). Thus, finding differences in ascriptions of retained mental attributes may 
have been a function of this potential confound. In fact, Hood and colleagues (2012) found 
that mind-body dualism in children was indeed more pronounced when the duplicated beings 
were given proper names.  To test whether the same is true for adults, and to rule out that the 
observed effect is entirely driven by this detail, we decided to replicate Study 1a with a 
paradigm that does not involve proper names. For this study, we expected the same pattern of 
results as for Study 1a, with potentially slightly reduced mind-body dualism. 
Method 
        Intuitive Mind-Body Dualism 15 
 
Participants and design. Fifty-eight MTurk workers (26 females; MAge = 34.6, SD = 
12.65) participated in exchange for monetary compensation. All participants worked on a no-
name variation of the previously introduced thought experiment. 
Materials and procedure.  To rule out that referring to two differently-named 
individuals artificially increased the perception of differences in retained mental states, we 
slightly modified the paradigm from Study 1a. Instead of assigning to the two hamsters the 
names Jimmy and Bert, they were only referred to as Ôthe original hamsterÕ and Ôthe duplicate 
hamsterÕ. In the list of physical and mental properties that was presented to participants prior 
to the duplication, the hamster was only referred to as ÒheÓ (cf. Table 2). Other than that, the 
procedure of this study was identical to Study 1a. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 No participants were excluded from data analysis. 
Consistent with our expectations, the hamster (original vs. duplicate) × dimension 
(physical vs. mental) interaction was significant, F(1, 57) = 19.31, p < .001; ηp² = .25 
Between original and duplicate, differences in ascription of retained mental properties 
(M = 2.09, SD = 1.92) were again greater than were differences in ascription of retained 
physical properties (M = 1.01, SD = 1.33), t(57) = 4.40, p < .001, d = 0.60.  
For the original hamster, there was no difference in ascription of retained physical (M 
= 6.64, SD = 0.80) vs. mental properties (M = 6.54, SD = 0.90), t(57) = 1.11, p > .27. In 
contrast, participants ascribed to the duplicate hamster a greater retention of physical 
properties (M = 5.63, SD = 1.43) than of mental properties (M = 4.45, SD = 1.78), t(57) = 
4.80, p < .001, d = 0.64 (Figure 3).  Replicating Study 1a using a slightly modified paradigm, 
these results show that the hitherto observed effect cannot solely be attributed to the fact that 
the two hamsters in Study 1a were given proper names that may have promoted the perception 
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of mental distinctness. Yet, one could still argue that merely referring to both hamsters as Òthe 
originalÓ and Òthe duplicateÓ already emphasizes the existence of two distinct individuals. 
This particular issue can only be ruled out by a paradigm exclusively involving one single 
individual, such as the one employed in Studies 4a and 4b. 
 
{FIGURE 3} 
 
Study 1c 
 Although Studies 1a and 1b show that adults seem to reliably dissociate a hamsterÕs 
mental from its physical properties, the question remains whether this effect is uniquely tied 
to animals or whether the same could be expected for people thinking about other human 
beings. Further, it may be possible that the effects observed thus far could have been caused 
by some kind of response tendency in participants, who may have felt inclined to answer 
questions regarding the duplicate hamster differently than questions pertaining to the original. 
This study was designed to rule out these concerns. First, to show that the observed effect 
exceeds reasoning about mental states of a hamster, we developed a variation of the thought 
experiment in which a human being is duplicated instead of a hamster. 
Second, to demonstrate that the effect is indeed caused by a decreased attribution of a 
mind to the duplicate and not by a mere response tendency or any side-effect of item specifics 
(e.g. a different level of complexity between physical and mental items), we also included a 
variation of the thought experiment for which we expected participants to indicate no (or only 
little) dualism, that is, high retention values on both mental and physical items for the original 
and for the duplicate. More precisely, in this condition a non-living entity (a robot) is 
duplicated. As a robot is an object that is commonly understood as possessing no brain and 
hence no mind, we expected to find no indication of mind-body dualism, orÑas we have a 
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natural tendency to anthropomorphize such entities (e.g., Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & 
Keysers, 2007)Ñto find it significantly reduced. 
Pretest. We conducted a pretest to determine whether participants in fact ascribe a 
mind to a robot to a lesser degree than to a human. Eighty MTurk participants (MAge = 20.69, 
SD = 8.38) were presented with the previously outlined 12 statements either describing a 
robot or a human scientist. They were then asked to indicate on dichotomous scales (yes vs. 
no) whether they think the respective entity has a physical body, whether it has a mind, and 
whether such a human/robot could actually exist. As expected, while participants did not 
differ in their ascription of a physical body to the scientist (93%) and the robot (85%, FisherÕs 
exact p >.30), they ascribed a mind to the robot to a significantly lesser degree (23%) than to 
the scientist (95%, p < .001). Further, participants did not differ in their opinion about 
whether such a robot (97%) or human (98%) could actually exist (p >.99). 
 
Method 
Participants and design. One-hundred twenty-two MTurk workers (43 females, MAge 
= 32.34, SD = 10.52) participated in exchange for monetary compensation. All participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions and worked on a variation of the previously 
introduced no-names thought experiment task, either involving a human being or a robot as 
the object of duplication. 
Materials and procedure. The procedure was for the most part identical to Study 1b. 
Participants were again presented with twelve properties, this time either describing a human 
scientist or a robot. To create these variations of the thought experiment paradigm, we 
modified the twelve properties previously used to describe the lab hamster. In doing so, we 
tried to come up with properties that match the underlying construct of each original property 
as closely as possible. For example, while the hamster was trained to find his way through a 
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complex maze in under 10 seconds, the human scientist was able to solve a RubikÕs Cube in 
under 60 seconds, whereas the robot was programmed to solve a complex math puzzle in 
under 10 milliseconds (see Table 2).  
 After being informed about the successful duplication procedure, participants were 
again asked about the level of retained mental vs. physical attributes of both the original and 
the duplicate. As before, responses to the six mental and physical attributes for both the 
original and the duplicate were collapsed to form the respective indices. Reliabilities for these 
indices were again satisfactory
6
. 
 
{TABLE 2} 
Results and Discussion 
 No participants were excluded from data analysis. 
 Comparing the results of the human duplication with the robot duplication, a 
significant three-way interaction, target (human vs. robot) × exemplar (original vs. duplicate) 
× dimension (physical vs. mental/computational), emerged, F(1, 120) = 6.64, p = .011, ηp² = 
.05. 
Human. Consistent with our expectations, participants indicated for the human being 
the same mind-body dissociation they previously indicated for a duplicated hamster. A 2×2 
within-subjects ANOVA revealed the predicted human (original vs. duplicate) × dimension 
(physical vs. mental) interaction; F(1, 66) = 14.07, p < .001, ηp² = .18. 
                                                
6
 CronbachÕs αs: Human: Original(physical) = .55, Duplicate(physical) = .75 ., Original(mental) = .50, 
Duplicate(mental) = .82.  
Robot: Original(physical) = .78, Duplicate(physical) = .81, Original(mental) = .85, Duplicate(mental) = .90. 
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Again, between original and duplicate, differences in ascription of retained mental 
attributes were greater (M = 1.05, SD = 1.30) than differences in ascription of retained 
physical properties (M = 0.48, SD = 0.92), t(66) = 3.75, p < .001, d = 0.47.  
Analyzing responses to each individual human, we again found differences in ascribed 
mental (M = 4.92, SD = 1.40) versus physical attributes (M = 6.26, SD = 0.98) for the 
duplicate, t(66) = 7.61, p < .001, d = 0.95. However, unlike in the previous Studies 1a and 1b, 
we also found significant differences in ascriptions of retained mental (M = 5.98, SD = 0.62) 
versus physical attributes (M = 6.74, SD = 0.54) for the original, t(66) = 9.63; p < .001, d = 
1.19. That is, participants indicated that the duplication procedure somehow altered the mental 
states of the original scientist. Although it is not entirely clear why this pattern emerges, it is 
conceivable that participants perceived the human being to be more aware of the duplication 
procedure, its purpose, and its implications. These are all factors that may have affected the 
human emotionally and cognitively, and may as a result have altered his mental states. Still, 
as reported above, differences were significantly greater for the duplicate, again revealing an 
intuitive belief in mind-body dualism in participants. 
 Robot. For the robot, we expected participants to indicate no (or a decreased level of) 
mind-body dualism. Therefore, we took care not to describe the robot in an 
anthropomorphized manner, in order to not foster the ascription of a mind, which would in 
theory produce the same pattern of results that we found for the hamster or the human (cf. 
Table 2). 
 In line with our reasoning, no significant robot × dimension interaction emerged, F(1, 
54) = 0.01, p = .946. More precisely, differences between ascribed computational and 
physical properties were not significantly different between original (M = 0.38, SD = 0.84) 
and duplicate robot (M = 0.39, SD = 0.96), t(54) = 0.07, p > .9. Further, there was no 
difference between ascriptions of retained computational (M = 6.33, SD = 1.08) versus 
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physical attributes (M = 6.31, SD = 1.00) for the original robot, t(54) = 0.23, p > .8, and 
likewise no difference between ascriptions of retained computational (M = 5.94, SD = 1.38) 
versus physical attributes (M = 5.93, SD = 1.31) for the duplicate robot, t(54) = 0.07, p > .9. 
Exceeding our original hypothesis, we found an intuitive mind-body dissociation only 
for participants who were asked to reason about another human being, that is, a being that is 
considered to have a mind, as opposed to a ÒmindlessÓ robot. While participants assumed that 
mental states of a human partially vanish during a physical duplication procedure, the same is 
not true for a robot who possesses similar characteristics, indicating that it is indeed 
something unique to the perception of minds that drives the effect observed (Figure 4).  
 
{FIGURE 4} 
Further, results of this study indicate that the previously reported findings cannot 
solely be attributed to a response tendency (as participants did not show this tendency for the 
robot duplication), the fact that the experiments involved an animal rather than a human, to a 
perceived inaccuracy of the duplication device, or to other attributes specific to the previously 
used items assessing mental and physical properties. 
However, in the subsequent studies, we reverted to using the original hamster 
paradigm from Study 1a. The reasons for this decision are thatÑas the present study showsÑ
the hamster paradigm more clearly captures the proposed mind-body dualism in participants, 
as they seem to perceive the original humanÕs mental states to be more affected by the 
duplication procedure than the hamsterÕs. Second, when presenting participants with a 
scenario involving the duplication of a human being, religious considerations (e.g., about 
immortal souls) may undesirably affect their responses.  
 
Study 2 
        Intuitive Mind-Body Dualism 21 
 
As research in developmental psychology shows, we all seem to be ãnatural-born 
dualistsÒ (Bloom, 2004). Yet, many children learn rather early in their lives that the brain is 
factually responsible for any sort of mental phenomena humans and animals may experience 
(Johnson, 1990). That is, they acquire scientific knowledge about the origins of mental life. 
However, despite this acquired knowledge, the results of the present studies indicate that even 
adults tend to intuitively dissociate mental processes from physical matter. Thus, it is possible 
that the intuitive mind-body dualism that children seem to endorse is still present in adults, 
who may correct for this intuition by relying on acquired scientific knowledge that opposes 
dualistic concepts. One can further assume, that this correction process must require the use of 
cognitive resources to override the default tendency to dissociate minds from bodies. 
Interfering with this correction process should thus increase responses in line with a belief in 
mind-body dualism. Therefore, the subsequent study was designed to test the hypothesis that 
taxing peopleÔs cognitive resources via a cognitive load manipulation will interfere with the 
aforementioned correction process, resulting in responses indicating more pronounced 
dualistic beliefs (see Gilbert, 2002). 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-three US-American MTurk workers (30 females, 
MAge = 31.27, SD = 9.59) participated in exchange for monetary compensation. Participants 
were either assigned to a low cognitive load or a high cognitive load condition. 
Materials and procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were 
instructed to remember a 7-character code sequence. In the low cognitive load condition, 
participants were asked to remember a simple string (Ò1234567Ó), whereas participants in the 
high cognitive load condition were asked to remember a complicated string (Òn63#m1QÓ) 
(cf., Conway & Gawronski, 2013; DeShon, Brown, & Greenis, 1996). Subsequently, all 
participants worked on the thought experiment task from Study 1a. Finally, participants were 
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asked to recall the code sequence they memorized and to indicate on a scale ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much) how difficult they found memorizing it. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 No participants were excluded from data analysis. 
Manipulation check. As expected, participants in the high load condition (M = 3.92, 
SD = 2.16) found it more difficult to remember the code sequence  than did participants in the 
low cognitive load condition (M = 1.35, SD = 0.91), t(28.53) = 5.69, p < .001, d = 2.13. 
 Main analysis. Consistent with our hypothesis, results of a 2×2×2 mixed ANOVA 
revealed the predicted hamster (original vs. duplicate) × dimension (physical vs. mental) × 
cognitive load (low vs. high) interaction, F(1, 71) = 5.44, p = .023, ηp
2
 = .07. Specifically, 
over both load conditions, we replicated the basic effect from Study 1a, F(1, 72) = 50.34, p < 
.001, ηp² = .41. Importantly, however, differences in the ascription of retained mental vs. 
physical properties for the duplicate hamster were greater in the high load condition (M = 
1.77, SD = 1.81) than in the low load condition (M = 0.90, SD = 1.51), t(41.74) = 2.05, p = 
.047, d = 0.63, indicating increased intuitive mind-body dualism in the high load condition. 
For the original hamster, differences in the ascription of retained mental vs. physical 
properties did not differ between load conditions (p > .9) (Figure 5). 
 
{FIGURE 5} 
 
Replicating the main result of the previous studies, participants again showed a clear 
dissociation of minds and bodies, represented by their diverging ascriptions of retained 
physical and mental properties to a duplicated hamster. Critically, for participants under 
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cognitive load a stronger dissociation emerged, suggesting that taxing peopleÔs cognitive 
resources prevents them from correcting their default dualistic beliefs.  
  
Study 3a 
Having shown that taxing peopleÕs cognitive resources seems to attenuate their 
tendency to correct their intuitive dualistic beliefs, another set of studies was designed to test 
whether this increase in mind-body dualism can in fact be attributed to an increased reliance 
on intuition rather than to any other effect unique to cognitive load manipulations. As we 
assume that adults are intuitive mind-body dualists, activating a mindset that promotes 
intuitive (vs. analytical) thinking should increase dualistic beliefs.  
Method 
Participants and design. Sixty-two German university students (40 females, MAge = 
25.84, SD = 2.96) were recruited via a University mailing-list and participated in exchange for 
a chance to win one of three 20€ gift certificates. Participants were either assigned to an 
analytical or an intuitive thinking style priming condition. 
Materials and procedure. Participants worked on a procedural priming task intended 
to activate a mindset characterized by an analytical vs. intuitive thinking style. Instructions 
stated: ÒPlease write a paragraph (approximately 8-10 sentences) describing a time your 
intuition/first instinct [vs. Òcarefully reasoning through a situationÓ] led you in the right 
direction and resulted in a good outcome.Ó (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). Subsequently, 
participants worked on the thought experiment task from Study 1a. 
Results and Discussion 
 Six participants did not work on the priming task and were thus excluded from 
analyses. Consistent with our prediction, results of a 2×2×2 mixed ANOVA revealed the 
predicted hamster (original vs. duplicate) × dimension (physical vs. mental) × thinking style 
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(analytical vs. intuitive) interaction, F(1, 54) = 7.94, p = .007, ηp
2
 = .13. Again, we replicated 
the basic effect from Study 1a over both priming conditions, F(1, 55) = 83.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.60. Replicating and conceptually extending Study 2, differences in the ascription of retained 
mental vs. physical properties for the duplicate hamster were greater when participants were 
primed with an intuitive thinking style (M = 3.46, SD = 1.88) than when they were primed 
with an analytical thinking style (M = 1.99, SD = 1.99), t(54) = 2.81, p = .007, d = 0.77, 
indicating increased intuitive mind-body dualism in the intuitive thinking condition. For the 
original hamster, differences in the ascription of retained mental vs. physical properties did 
not differ between thinking style conditions (p > .6) (Figure 6). Results of this study indicate 
that the effects reported in Study 2 can indeed be explained by participants relying on 
analytical thinking in order to partially correct their intuitive belief in mind-body dualism. 
 
 
{FIGURE 6} 
 
Study 3b 
In this study, we planned on directly replicating Study 3a in a laboratory setting with 
more participants. We further added two explicit measures of mind-body dualism, one of 
which was previously used to assess overt dualistic beliefs (Forstmann et al., 2012). As we 
assume that explicit beliefs in dualism are affected by a cognitive correction process that is 
based on acquired cultural knowledge, we expected to only find a moderate relation between 
explicit and intuitive measures of dualism. Further, as this knowledge should be readily 
accessible to participants, we did not expect to find effects of our experimental manipulation 
on explicit dualistic beliefs. 
Method 
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Participants and design. One-hundred and twenty German university students (63 
females, MAge = 22.33, SD = 2.74) participated in exchange for a chocolate bar. Participants 
were again assigned to either an analytical or an intuitive thinking style priming condition. 
Materials and procedure. The procedure was identical to the one employed in Study 
3a except that, in addition, participants also answered a set of questions after completing the 
thought experiment task to assess explicit beliefs in mind-body dualism. First, they responded 
to a 7-point pictorial measure of mind-body dualism (Forstmann et al., 2012). This item 
consisted of seven diagrams, each comprised of two circles, vertically centered on a 
horizontal line. From top to bottom, the circles gradually converged (cf., Schubert & Otten, 
2002). The left circle was labeled ÒbodyÓ, the right circle was labeled ÒmindÓ. The 
instructions asked participants to indicate which of the different constellations best represents 
their idea of how their body relates to their mind. Responses were coded such that high values 
indicate stronger beliefs in mind-body dualism. This item was followed by a questionnaire 
comprised of four items assessing agreement with dualistic/physicalistic statements on a scale 
from 1 (do not agree) to 7 (very much agree) (e.g., ãMinds can exist independently of 
bodiesÒ). Again, high values indicate stronger beliefs in mind-body dualism.  
Results and Discussion 
 Similar to Study 3a, 12 participants who did not follow instructions to the priming task 
were excluded from data analyses. Consistent with our prediction, results of a 2×2×2 mixed 
ANOVA revealed the predicted hamster (original vs. duplicate) ×  dimension (physical vs. 
mental) × thinking style (analytical vs. intuitive) interaction, F(1, 106) = 5.55, p = .020, ηp
2
 = 
.05. Again, we replicated the basic effect from Study 1a over both priming conditions; F(1, 
107) = 256.54, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .71. As in Study 3a, differences in the ascription of retained 
mental vs. physical properties for the duplicate hamster were greater when participants were 
primed with an intuitive thinking style (M = 3.39, SD = 1.90) than when they were primed 
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with an analytical thinking style (M = 2.50, SD = 2.15), t(106) = 2.29, p = .024, d = 0.44, 
indicating increased mind-body dualism in the intuitive thinking style condition. For the 
original hamster, differences in the ascription of retained mental vs. physical properties did 
not differ between thinking style conditions (p > .7) (Figure 7). 
 Explicit measures. In order to compare the results of the thought experiment task with 
the subsequent measures, we calculated an overall Òintuitive dualismÓ score. First, differences 
in the ascription of retained mental vs. physical properties were calculated for both the 
original and the duplicate hamster. The discrepancy between these difference scores can be 
understood as representing the strength of a participantÕs intuitive belief in mind-body 
dualism.  
This intuitive dualism score was found to be marginally correlated with the pictorial 
measure of explicit mind-body dualism, r(108) = .17, p = .073 and significantly correlated 
with the four-item scale assessing dualistic beliefs, r(108) = .22, p = .017. However, reliability 
of the four-item scale was only modest (α = .43). 
A 2×2 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant thinking style (intuitive vs. analytical) × 
dualism type (intuitive vs. explicit[pictorial]) interaction; F(1, 106) = 5.74; p = .018, ηp
2
 = 
.05
7
. Specifically, while the thinking style manipulation affected participants intuitive 
dualistic beliefs as reported above, explicit dualistic beliefs in the intuitive thinking condition 
(M = 3.09, SD = 1.04) did not differ from those reported in the analytical thinking condition 
(M = 3.16, SD = 3.12), t(106) = 0.32, p = .748. Thus, in line with the proposition that our 
thought experiment paradigm assesses intuitive dualistic beliefs, a priming procedure 
promoting intuitive thinking only affected responses on this particular measure, while not 
                                                
7
 Including mean responses to the 4-item dualism scale in the ANOVA instead of the pictorial item revealed a 
marginally significant priming (intuitive vs. analytical) × dualism type (intuitive vs. explicit[scale]) interaction 
F(1, 106) = 2.90; p = .092, ηp
2
 = .03. 
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affecting responses on previously used explicit measures of dualism. Further, as theorized, 
intuitive and explicit measures of mind-body dualism were found to only be moderately 
correlated. However, given the low reliability of the explicit dualism scale, more research is 
needed to understand the exact relationship between both constructs. 
 
{FIGURE 7} 
 
Study 4a 
So far, we established a reliable measure of intuitive mind body dualism in adults, 
showing that people indeed perceive mental and physical properties of a being to be partially 
independent. Yet, the question remains which processes underlie the observed effect. 
Specifically, which aspects of the thought experiment may trigger the intuitive separation of 
mind and body? Therefore, the last set of studies was designed to investigate whether the 
intuitive mind-body dualism most people seem to share can at least partially be explained by 
essentialistic reasoning about the nature of the mind.  
In order to be able to answer this question, we first developed and validated a single-
individual variation of our thought experiment, a task more closely resembling ParfitÕs (1985) 
original ÒteleportationÓ paradigm. Parfit posed the question, whether a human being that was 
scanned, destroyed, and artificially recreated from new atoms at a different location could still 
be considered the same person.  
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty MTurk workers (34 females, MAge = 34.23, SD = 
10.95) participated in exchange for monetary compensation. All participants worked on a 
single-individual variation of the previously introduced thought experiment assessing intuitive 
mind-body dualism. 
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Materials and procedure. In this study, we modified the existing paradigm to only 
involve one single individual. Specifically, participants were told that Jimmy, the original 
hamster, was scanned and duplicated, a procedure during which his original body was 
destroyed. Therefore, the subsequent questions addressing retained physical and mental 
properties only pertained to that one, ÒteleportedÓ, hamster. Responses regarding physical 
properties (α = .82) and mental properties (α = .96) were each combined to build individual 
indices representing the perceived retention of the respective dimension. Again, if people do 
separate minds from bodies and perceive the mind to be an essence not defined by physical 
properties, they should ascribe to the teleported hamster more retained physical than mental 
properties. 
Results and Discussion 
 No participants were excluded from data analysis. 
Consistent with our hypothesis that people would dissociate minds and bodies even in 
the absence of a second being, a paired-sample t-test revealed that participants ascribed to the 
teleported hamster a greater degree of retained physical (M = 6.14, SD = 1.05) than mental 
properties (M = 5.17, SD = 1.86), t(79) = 5.23, p < .001, d = 0.64
8
. 
Thus, adopting a teleportation paradigm involving only one individual, participants 
again revealed a dissociation of physical and mental properties: Retained mental properties 
were ascribed to a teleported hamster to a lesser degree than were physical properties. 
Additionally, this variation of the thought experiment helps to rule out concerns regarding the 
presence of two individuals in the duplication paradigm that may have artificially increased 
mind-body dualism, helps to further rule out issues with potential response tendencies in the 
                                                
8
 In this study, 20 participants (~25% of the sample) ascribed maximum retention values (i.e., a mean of 7) to 
both mental and physical properties of the teleported hamster, revealing a response pattern in line with the notion 
of physicalism.  
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duplication paradigm (see Study 1c), and allows to further explore the role of essentialistic 
thinking in intuitive mind-body dualism in the following study. 
  
Study 4b 
This final study was designed to find out more about the processes underlying the 
effects observed thus far. In order to do so, this study utilizes a variation of the thought 
experiment from Study 4a to test the proposition that people are Òessentialistic dualistsÓ. 
Specifically, we reasoned that people may perceive the mind to be an essence that is inherent 
in each physical part that makes up a living being (see Newman & Keil, 2008). If that was the 
case, replacing the physical parts that make up a being with new partsÑas in the hitherto 
described thought experimentsÑmay strip the being of this essence (and hence its mind), a 
notion comparable to the ancient Greek allegory of the ÒShip of TheseusÓ (Clough, 2001). 
This classic thought experiment raises the question that if one was to consecutively substitute 
every individual part that makes up a ship, does the ship remain the same ship, or does it 
become a different ship altogether? In the case of atoms and moleculesÑthe basis of the 
present thought experimentÑthis question becomes even more striking, as there is technically 
no way to distinguish one atom from another. They are factually identical. 
If people believe the mind to be an immaterial property that constitutes the core 
essence of an individual and that is attached to its physical matter, the dissociation of mental 
and physical properties should be greatly reduced if a ÒteleportedÓ being is merely 
disintegrated and reassembled, that is, if it is comprised of the very same atoms as it was 
before that were only transported to a different location (cf., Blok, Newman, & Rips, 2005; 
Rhemtulla & Hall, 2009). That way, any immeasurable quality (i.e., the mind) that is inherent 
to the originalÕs physical parts should survive the teleportation procedure. 
Method 
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Participants and design. One-hundred and fifty MTurk workers (66 females, MAge = 
37.25, SD = 21.31) participated in exchange for monetary compensation. Participants were 
either assigned to a ÒrecreationÓ or a ÒreassemblyÓ variation of the hamster teleportation 
paradigm from Study 4a. 
Materials and procedure. To test the idea that essentialistic reasoning about the 
nature of the mind can explain the effects reported thus far, we first created a variation of the 
thought experiment introduced in Study 4a, in which the teleportation device is described in a 
slightly different manner. After they were told that a computer scans the entire object that is to 
be teleported, participants in the ÒrecreationÓ condition read that Ò[the] information is then 
used to recreate the scanned object in a second chamber [É] from basic chemical elements, 
molecule for molecule, while the original object is being destroyed.Ó 
 Conversely, participants in the ÒreassemblyÓ condition read that Ò[the] object is then 
disintegrated. That is, all molecules of the object are separated from each other and 
transported through a pipe to a second chamber. The stored information is then used to 
reassemble the object (B) from its original molecules [É]Ó. Further the graphical depiction of 
the apparatus was changed to match the description above (see Supplementary Materials). 
Subsequently, participants in both conditions were introduced to the lab hamster, read 
the 12 facts describing his physical and mental properties, and answered questions regarding 
their perceived retention of these properties after the teleportation. 
Results and Discussion 
 No participants were excluded from data analysis. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, a 2×2 mixed ANOVA revealed the predicted mode of 
teleportation (recreation vs. reassembly) × dimension (physical vs. mental) interaction, F(1, 
148) = 4.62, p = .033, ηp
2
 = .03. More precisely, there was a greater difference in the 
ascription of retained physical vs. mental properties in the condition in which the hamster was 
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recreated from new molecules than in the condition in which the original molecules were 
reassembled.  
As in Study 4a, when the hamster was created from entirely new molecules, 
participants ascribed to him a greater retention of physical properties (M = 6.15, SD = 1.26) 
than of mental properties (M = 5.30, SD = 1.70), t(82) = 4.79, p < .001, d = 0.54.  
Notably though, although the differences between ascriptions of mental and physical 
properties is greatly reduced in the reassembly condition, it remains statistically significant. 
Even in this condition, participants ascribe to the teleported hamster a greater retention of 
physical (M = 6.47, SD = 0.82) than of mental properties (M = 6.10, SD = 1.27), t(66) = 3.18, 
p = .002, d = 0.44 (see Figure 8), showing that even in this procedure some of the mental 
essence that is part of the original is lost in the teleportation procedure.  
Unexpectedly, we also found a marginally significant difference between the 
ascription of retained physical attributes to the recreated (M = 6.15, SD = 1.26) as compared 
to the reassembled hamster (M = 6.47, SD = 0.82), t(142.07) = 1.91, p = .058, d = 0.32. This 
may be explainable by participants perceiving the reassembly device to be somehow more 
accurate in creating a perfect copy than the recreation device. After all, in the recreation 
device, the parts that made up the original were ÒdestroyedÓ. This higher accuracyÑone could 
argueÑmay in turn be responsible for the heightened levels of ascribed mental properties to 
the reassembled hamster. Therefore, similar to Study 1a, we decided to independently analyze 
the data of only those participants whoÑregardless of experimental conditionÑascribed the 
maximum level of retained physical attributes to the respective hamster (~51% of the sample). 
In line with our reasoning, ascription of retained mental properties remained greater for 
participants in the reassembly condition (M = 6.87, SD = 0.28) than in the recreation condition 
(M = 6.10, SD = 1.55), t(40.68) = 3.05, p = .004, d = 0.96. 
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{FIGURE 8} 
 
In sum, the present study provides initial process evidence for the intuitive mind-body 
dualism people seem to entertain. In line with a framework of psychological essentialism, the 
data suggests that people do indeed perceive mental states to be a non-physical quality that is 
tightly linked to physical matter, even on a molecular level. While any kind of molecule 
seems to be sufficient to recreate the physical body of a being, it is only ÒoriginalÓ molecules 
that carry a great portion of that beingÕs mental properties.  
Reassembling the original molecules of the hamster, however, does not fully eliminate 
intuitive mind-body dualism in participants. Although it is greatly reduced, they still ascribe 
to the reassembled individual a lesser retention of mental states as compared to the original. 
One possible explanation could be that people perceive the mind to not just be an essence that 
is attached to physical property that can be disassembled and reassembled at will. If the mind 
is considered an emergent property of a certain combination of physical matter, temporarily 
dissolving the mind may be perceived as irrevocably altering it to some extent. This can be 
related to the proposition that self-continuity in space and time is a fundamental component of 
personal identity (e.g., Sani, 2008; Dunkel, 2005), whichÑin our caseÑis clearly interrupted 
by the teleportation procedure.  
 
 
General Discussion 
Using a variety of novel thought-experiment tasks, eight studies converge in 
demonstrating that adults are intuitive mind-body dualists. Over all studies, participants 
ascribed to a mechanically duplicated/teleported living being a greater retention of physical 
than of mental properties. This difference was only found for duplicated beings that were 
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considered to actually have a mind, and was unrelated to whether the respective being was 
given a proper name. It was further shown that this intuitive dissociation of minds and bodies 
may be considered a default: Taxing participantsÕ cognitive resources or priming them with an 
intuitive (versus analytical) thinking style both increased dualistic beliefs. Lastly, a final set of 
studies demonstrated that the perceived dissociation of minds and bodies can be partially 
explained by essentialistic reasoning about the nature of the mind. When the living being was 
reassembled from its original molecules rather than recreated from (factually 
indistinguishable) new molecules, mind-body dualism was significantly reduced.  
Yet, at lot is still to be learned about the precise manifestation and boundary 
conditions of the nave dualism that we find in our studies. From the current set of data, one 
can assume that participants intuitively endorse a certain degree of Cartesian substance 
dualism. That is, mental phenomena are considered to be (to some extent) independent from 
physical matter. If participants were to entertain a classic property dualismÑthe view that 
minds are a fully emergent property of, yet not reducible to, neurological activityÑthey 
would not show the decreased ascription of mental states to the duplicate being that we find in 
Studies 1 to 3. 
However, our results are also not fully in line with a classic Cartesian substance 
dualism account, as mental properties are not treated as fully independent from physical 
properties. As our last study shows, people perceive the Òmental substanceÓ to be tightly 
linked to its physical counterpart. In fact, more in line with theories of psychological 
essentialism, people seem to perceive the mind to be partly inherent in the physical matter that 
makes up an entity, even on a molecular level. Thus, one could say that people are apparently 
Òessentialistic dualistsÓ. Still, the question whether this particular mental essence is perceived 
to be uniformly distributed throughout the entity, as has been suggested by some researchers 
(Newman & Keil, 2008), or whether it is still being primarily located in the head or brain 
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(Starmans & Bloom, 2012), remains open. Future research may shed some light on this issue, 
for example, by looking at how variations in malfunctions of duplication procedures or 
intentional removal of different physical properties affects attributions of specific mental 
properties.  
One noteworthy characteristic of the current thought experiment paradigm, however, 
is the strictly physical nature of the duplication/teleportation procedure that is conducted. 
Although this is apparently the most appropriate operationalization for the research questions 
at hand (i.e., whether participants ascribe to a physical duplicate a lesser retention of mental 
properties), the question remains whether other effects could be expected from a non-
mechanical duplication procedure. If, for example, participants were told a story about a witch 
thatÑpurely by willpowerÑmagically duplicated or teleported a hamster, differences in 
ascriptions of retained mental vs. physical attributes could be greatly reduced or even found to 
be inversed.  
 Another noteworthy observation is the correlation between intuitive and explicit 
beliefs in mind-body dualism that we assessed and reported in Study 3b. Although both 
concepts seem to be related, they do not correlate strongly. A possible explanation could be 
that either of the measures is not precise enough to capture the underlying construct properly. 
However, an intriguing alternative explanation could be that explicit and intuitive mind-body 
dualism are indeed partially independent constructs. In theory, intuitive beliefs could be the 
result of our phenomenological experience thatÑeither state- or trait-wiseÑaffects our gut 
feeling about scenarios such as the one presented in our studies. One the one hand, the feeling 
of occupying our bodies (Bloom, 2004), having a private mental life (Anthony, 2007), 
experiencing dreams, or engaging in mind-wandering (e.g., Mason et al., 2007), may all 
contribute to intuitive dualistic beliefs. On the other hand, the experience of our minds being 
effected by physiological factors such as pain, hunger, or psychoactive substances may foster 
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intuitive physicalistic beliefs. The same is conceivable for explicit beliefs. While some people 
may have had a more pronounced exposure to scientific knowledge regarding the physical 
origins of mental life, for example via education, othersÕ explicit beliefs may have been 
profoundly shaped by religious or philosophical teachings that emphasize the existence of an 
immaterial mental substance such as a soul or a spirit. If that was a case, it is possible to think 
of both intuitive dualists who explicitly endorse physicalistic beliefs and vice versa. 
Both the German as well as the US-American culture, that is, the cultures the present 
research was focused on, are at their core grounded on monotheistic Abrahamic religions, 
which proclaim both the existence of a supernatural being and the existence of an immaterial 
soul that survives the death of the physical body. On the other hand, these two societies can 
also be characterized by a strong prevalence of scientific rationale, which in combination may 
explain the variance in explicit beliefs in mind-body dualism earlier research reports (Proctor, 
2008; Hook & Farah, 2013; Forstmann et al, 2012). People with different cultural or religious 
backgroundsÑfor example from societies in Asia or AfricaÑmay very well differ in their 
explicit endorsement of dualistic or physicalistic statements (cf. Chudek et al., 2013). 
However, despite these cultural differences, our shared cognitive foundations should lead to a 
culturally ubiquitous presence of intuitive dualistic beliefs. 
As argued, finding this intuitive belief in mind-body dualism may help better 
understand important real-world phenomena such as the culturally ubiquitous emergence of 
religious and superstitious beliefs (Bering, 2006). Most religions involve some form of 
afterlife belief, which requires to accept the notion that some aspect of a person survives after 
his or her physical body ceases to exist, which is only possible when entertaining the idea that 
minds and bodies are somehow distinct. Further, as dualistic beliefs can be considered a 
logical requirement for ascribing minds to non-human entities, intuitive dualism may partially 
explain beliefs in supernatural agents, which have been found to be intimately linked to mind-
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perception and anthropomorphism (Gervais, 2013). However, this ability to ascribe minds to 
non-living entities may also have potentially negative side effects. If, for a dualists, perceiving 
minds is a process that is independent from perceiving physical bodies, they may similarly be 
more inclined to not perceive minds in people, that is, they may mentally strip others of their 
minds. Denying other people a mindÑand thus a uniquely human attributeÑis a key element 
in out-group derogation and dehumanization (Haslam, 2006).  
To conclude, in order to fully understand human cognition and behavior, itÕs crucial to 
understand how people themselves explain the worldÑthat is, how they believe social and 
non-social entities to operate. As these beliefs are fundamental to our understanding of the 
world, finding out more about their nature and their underlying processes on multiple levels of 
analysis is key for understanding why humans think and act the way they do in nearly every 
aspect of their lives.  
 
        Intuitive Mind-Body Dualism 37 
 
References 
Astuti, R., & Harris, P. L. (2008). Understanding mortality and the life of the ancestors in 
rural Madagascar. Cognitive Science, 32, 713-740. 
Bering, J. M. (2006). The folk psychology of souls. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29, 453-
462. 
Blok, S., Newman, G., & Rips, L. J. (2005). Individuals and their concepts. In W.-K. Ahn, R. 
L. Goldstone, B. C. Love, A. B. Markman, & P. Wolff (Eds.), Categorization inside 
and outside the laboratory: Essays in Honor of Douglas L. Medin (pp. 127Ð149). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Bloom, P. (2004). DescartesÕ baby. New York: Basic Books. 
Bloom, P. (2007). Religion is natural. Developmental Science, 10, 147-151. 
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained. New York: Basic Books. 
Burgmer, P., Forstmann, M., Todd, A. R., & Mussweiler, T. (2014). Connecting perspectives 
by disconnecting mind and body: Beliefs in mind-body dualism facilitate perspective-
taking. Manuscript in preparation. 
Choe, K., Keil, F., & Bloom, P. (2012). Developing intuitions about how personal and social 
properties are linked to the brain and the body. Infant and Child Development, 441, 
430Ð441.  
Chudek, M., MacNamara, R., Birch, S. A. J., Bloom, P., & Henrich, J. (2013). Developmental 
and cross-cultural evidence for intuative dualism. Manuscript in preparation. 
Clough, A.H. (2001). Plutarch's Lives, (Ed., J. Dryden, Trans.). New York: The Modern 
Library. 
Cohen, E. (2007). The mind possessed: The cognition of spirit possession in an Afro-Brazilian 
religious tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
        Intuitive Mind-Body Dualism 38 
 
Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2013). Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral 
decision making: A process dissociation approach. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 104, 216-235. 
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 
Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Ren 
Descartes (J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, Trans.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
DeShon, R. P., Brown, K. G., & Greenis, J. L. (1996). Does self-regulation require cognitive 
resources? Evaluation of resource allocation models of goal setting. Journal of  
Dunkel, C. S. (2005). The relation between self-continuity and measures of identity. Identity, 
5, 21-34. 
Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of 
anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114, 864-886. 
Forstmann, M., Burgmer, P., & Mussweiler, T. (2012). ÒThe mind is willing, but the flesh is 
weakÓ: The effects of mind-body dualism on health behavior. Psychological Science, 
23, 1239-1245. 
Gazzola, V., Rizzolatti, G., Wicker, B., & Keysers, C. (2007). The anthropomorphic brain: 
The mirror neuron system responds to human and robotic actions. Neuroimage, 35, 
1674-1684. 
Gelman, S. A. (2003). The essential child: Origins of essentialism in everyday thought. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Gelman, S. A., & Taylor, M. (1984). How two-year-old children interpret proper and common 
names for unfamiliar objects. Child Development, 55, 1535-1540. 
Gergely, G., Ndasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Br, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 
months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193. 
        Intuitive Mind-Body Dualism 39 
 
Gervais, W. M. (2013). Perceiving minds and gods: How mind perception enables, constrains, 
and is triggered by belief in gods. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 380-394. 
Gilbert, D.T. (2002). Inferential correction. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), 
Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 167Ð184). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gottfried, G. M., Gelman, S. A., & Schultz, J. (1999). Children's understanding of the brain: 
From early essentialism to biological theory. Cognitive Development, 14, 147-174. 
Gray, H. M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2007). Dimensions of mind perception. Science, 
315, 619. 
Gutheil, G., Gelman, S. A., Klein, E., Michos, K., & Kelaita, K. (2008). PreschoolersÔ use of 
spatiotemporal history, appearance, and proper name in determining individual 
identity. Cognition, 107, 366-380. 
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 10, 252-264. 
Hood, B. M., & Bloom, P. (2008). Children prefer certain individuals over perfect duplicates. 
Cognition, 106, 455-462. 
Hood, B., Gjersoe, N., & Bloom, P. (2012). Do children think that duplicating the body also 
duplicates the mind? Cognition, 125, 466-474. 
Hook, C. J., & Farah, M. J. (2013). Look again: Effects of brain images and mind-brain 
dualism on lay evaluations of research. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25, 1397-
1405. 
Johnson, C. N. (1990). If you had my brain, where would I be? ChildrenÕs understanding of 
the brain and identity. Child Development, 61, 962-972. 
Johnson, C. N., & Wellman, H. M. (1982). ChildrenÕs developing conceptions of the mind 
and brain. Child Development, 53, 222-234. 
        Intuitive Mind-Body Dualism 40 
 
Kuhlmeier, V. A., Bloom, P., & Wynn, K. (2004). Do 5-month-old infants see humans as 
material objects?. Cognition, 94, 95-103. 
Legerstee, M. (1992). A review of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy: Implications 
for models of social and cognitive knowing, Early Development and Parenting, 1, 59-
67. 
Lillard, A.S. (1996). Body or mind: ChildrenÕs understanding of pretense. Child Development, 
67, 1717-1734. 
Mason, M. F., Norton, M. I., Van Horn, J. D., Wegner, D. M., Grafton, S. T., & Macrae, C. N. 
(2007). Wandering minds: The default network and stimulus-independent thought. 
Science, 315, 393-395. 
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony 
(Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 179-195). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Morris, S. B., & DeShon, R. P. (2002). Combining effect size estimates in meta-analysis with 
repeated measures and independent-groups designs. Psychological Methods, 7, 105-
125. 
Nemeroff, C., & Rozin, P. (2000). The makings of the magical mind. In K. S. Rosengren, C. 
N. Johnson, & P. L. Harris (Eds.), Imagining the impossible: Magical, scientific, and 
religious thinking in children. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Newman, G. E., & Bloom, P. (2012). Art and authenticity: The importance of originals in 
judgments of value. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 558-569. 
Newman, G. E., & Keil, F. C. (2008). Where is the essence? Developmental shifts in 
childrenÕs beliefs about internal features. Child Development, 79, 1344-1356. 
Nolan, C. (Director). (2006). The Prestige [Motion Picture]. United States: Warner Bros. 
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
        Intuitive Mind-Body Dualism 41 
 
Povinelli, D. J., & Bering, J. M. (2002). The mentality of apes revisited. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 11, 115-119. 
Proctor, C. C. T. (2008). Clinicians' and laypeople's beliefs about the causal basis and 
treatment of mental disorders (Unpublished dissertation). Yale University, New York. 
Rhemtulla, M., & Hall, D. G. (2009). Basic-level kinds and object persistence. Memory & 
Cognition, 37, 292-301. 
Roazzi, M., Nyhof, M., & Johnson, C. (2013). Mind, soul and spirit: Conceptions of 
immaterial identity in different cultures. International Journal for the Psychology of 
Religion, 23, 75-86. 
Sani, F. (Ed.). (2008). Self continuity: Individual and collective perspectives. New York: 
Taylor & Francis. 
Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people. The role of the 
temporo-parietal junction in Òtheory of mind.Ó NeuroImage, 19, 1835-1842. 
Schubert, T. W., & Otten, S. (2002). Overlap of self, ingroup, and outgroup: Pictorial 
measures of self-categorization. Self and Identity, 1, 535-576. 
Shenhav, A., Rand, D. G., & Greene, J. D. (2012). Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences 
belief in God. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 423-428. 
Shtulman, A., & Valcarcel, J. (2012). Scientific knowledge suppresses but does not supplant 
earlier intuitions. Cognition, 124, 209-215. 
Starmans, C., & Bloom, P. (2012). Windows to the soul: Children and adults see the eyes as 
the location of the self. Cognition, 123, 313-318. 
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind 
development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72, 655-684. 
        Intuitive Mind-Body Dualism 42 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research was funded by a Leibniz Award by the German Science Foundation (DFG) 
awarded to Thomas Mussweiler (MU 1500/5-1). 
We would like to thank Thomas Mussweiler, Andrew R. Todd, Paul Conway, Christina 
Sagioglou, as well as the members of the Social Cognition Center Cologne for their help at 
various stages of this project. Both authors contributed equally to this research. 
